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Abstract—Assuming that individuals are altruistic, this paper 
employs an overlapping generations model with lifetime 
uncertainty to study the partially funded public pension in 
China. By comparing the market economy equilibrium with 
the social optimum allocation, we find the optimal firm 
contribution rate. Our simulation results show that this rate 
increases when the life expectancy rises, while decreases when 
the population growth rate falls. It decreases in the joint case 
of risen life expectancy and fallen population growth rate 
because it is much more sensitive to the latter than to the 
former. The result has some policy implications. 
Keywords-altruism; lifetime uncertainty; public pension; 
contribution rat 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese State Council Document 38 of 2005, 
“Decision on Improving Basic Pension System for Enterprise 
Employees”, was issued in December, 2005. It introduces a 
new public pension system in the urban area: The 
government establishes an individual account for each 
employee and a social pool for all employees and retirees. 
Each firm contributes 20% of its payroll to the social pool, 
while each employee contributes 8% of her wage to her 
individual account. The social pool fund is used to pay the 
current retirees as pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension benefits, 
while the accumulation in the individual account is used to 
pay the individual herself when she retires as fully funded 
pension benefits. Each retiree receives funded pension 
benefits from her individual account and PAYG pension 
benefits from the social pool. Such a public pension system 
is called a partially funded system. 
It is worth studying the contribution rates in the 
following environment: The people are altruistic through 
bequests or gifts. The population growth rate has fallen 
because of the family planning (one-child) policy, and the 
life expectancy has risen because of improved living and 
medical conditions. 
Sheshinski and Weiss [1] examine the annuity aspect of 
social security within the framework of an overlapping 
generations (OLG) model, in which the duration of life is 
assumed to be uncertain. Abel [2] solves the consumption 
and portfolio decision problem of a consumer who lives for 
either one period or two periods and who can hold his wealth 
in the form of riskless bonds and actuarially fair annuities. 
Abel [3] demonstrates the effect of a lump-sum tax on debt 
neutrality in an OLG model with lifetime uncertainty. There 
is not any production sector in these models. Fuster [4] 
studies how the lack of an annuities market affects savings 
behavior and intergenerational transfers in a dynastic OLG 
economy. It is found that the answer to this question depends 
crucially on altruism. Zhang et al. [5] examine how mortality 
decline affects long-run steady state growth by assuming 
actuarially fair annuity markets in an OLG model with 
uncertain lifetime and social security. 
Samuelson [6] studies the optimum social security in a 
life-cycle growth model. He adjusts the capital-labor ratio to 
the modified golden rule level to maximize the social welfare 
by controlling the social security taxes. The approach to find 
the optimal social security is to equate the interest rate in the 
decentralized economy to the growth rate of economy. 
Blanchard and Fischer [7] elaborate the principle of social 
optimum. Social planner maximizes social welfare by 
rationally allocating social resources. This approach can be 
used to derive the optimal pension contribution rate in 
China’s partially funded public pension system. 
Based on the literature, we employ an OLG model with 
altruism and lifetime uncertainty to investigate the public 
pension system in China’s urban area. We introduce 
production sector into Abel’s [2] model, and replace the fully 
funded public pension system with a partially funded one. 
Instead of only individuals make pension contributions in the 
literature; both individuals and firms make contributions in 
this model. Applying the approach used by Samuelson [6], 
we seek the optimal contribution rates, and obtain a result 
that is helpful to firms. 
II. MARKET ECONOMY 
The generation born at the beginning of period t is called 
generation t. The population grows at the rate of n=Nt/Nt-1-1, 
where Nt is the population of generation t. Each individual 
survives to the end of her working period certainly, but 
survives in retirement period with probability [ ]1,0∈p .  
A. Individuals 
In the working period, each individual earns wage by 
supplying inelastically one unit of labor and makes pension 
contributions. She gets bequests or gifts from her parent, 
consumes part of her incomes and saves the rest. If she dies 
at the beginning of her retirement period, her savings with 
accrued interest and individual account benefits are inherited 
equally by her children as bequests. If she survives in the 
retirement period, she distributes her savings with accrued 
interest, individual account benefits and social pool benefits 
between her consumption and the gifts to her children. 
Each individual derives utility from her working-period 
consumption tc1 , possible retirement-period consumption 
12 +tc , bequests 
D
tb 1+  or gifts 
S
tb 1+ . The utility is described by 
an additively separable logarithmic function. Thus, the utility 
maximization problem is: 
Max ( ) StDtttt bpbpcpcU 11121 lnln1lnln +++ +−++= δδθ , (1) 
s.t.    ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ttStDtt swnpbbpc −−+++−= τ1111 ,     (2) 
( ) 111 1 +++ ++= tttDt Bsrb ,                                          (3) 
( ) 111112 1 +++++ +++=+ ttttStt PBsrbc ,                      (4) 
where ( )1,0∈θ  denotes the individual discount rate, 
( )1,0∈δ  the altruism intensity, wt the wage, τ the individual 
contribution rate, st the savings, rt+1 the interest rate, Bt+1 the 
individual account benefits, and Pt+1 the social pool benefits. 
Suppose that δθ >  since the limitation of altruism. The 
first-order conditions for the utility maximization problem 
are: 
( ) ( )[ ] tStDtt cbpbpr 1111 111 =+−+ +++δ ,          (5) 
121 ++ = t
S
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Equation (5) describes the tradeoff between the marginal 
utility of working-period consumption and that of bequests 
or gifts. Equation (6) describes the tradeoff between the 
marginal utility of gifts and that of retirement-period 
consumption. 
B. Firms 
Firms produce homogenous commodity in competitive 
markets. The production is described by Cobb-Douglas 
function αα −= 1ttt NAKY  or 
α
tt Aky = , where Yt is the output 
in period t, Kt the capital stock, ( )1,0∈α  the capital share of 
income, A the productivity, kt=Kt/Nt the capital-labor ratio, 
and yt the output-labor ratio. 
Firms make pension contributions at the rate of ( )1,0∈η  
on their payroll. According to the product distribution, one 
can get ( ) tttttt NwKrNAK ηαα ++=− 11 . The first-order 
conditions for the profit maximization are: 
1−
=
αα tt Akr ,                               (7) 
( ) ( )ηα α +−= 11 tt Akw .                   (8) 
C. The Government 
The social pool fund is paid to the retirees in the current 
period as PAYG pension benefits: tttt NwPpN η=−1 , or ( ) pwnP tt η+= 1 .                      (9) 
The accumulation in the individual account is used to pay 
the individual when she retires in the next period as funded 
pension benefits: 
( ) ttt wrB τ11 1 ++ += .                     (10) 
D. The Capital Market 
The savings and the individual pension contributions in 
period t generate the capital stock in period t+1 (See 
Blanchard and Fischer [7] or Barro and Sala-i-Martin [8] for 
details): 
( ) 11 ++=+ ttt knws τ .                    (11) 
E. Dynamic Equilibrium System 
Substituting (2)-(4) and (7)-(11) into (5)-(6) and 
arranging gives a dynamic equilibrium system described by 
the following difference equation: 
( )
( ) ( )
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
⋅++
+
+
=
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
⋅++
+
−
⋅⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
⋅++
+
−+−+
++++
+++++
+
αα
ααα
ααα
η
αη
αδθ
α
η
αη
αδθ
δ
η
αη
αδθ
θ
1111
11111
1
1
11
1
11
1
11
tttt
ttttt
tttttt
Ak
p
Akknk
AkkpAk
p
Akkp
Ak
p
AkkpknAkk
. 
(12) 
The individual contribution rate has no effect on the 
capital-labor ratio because the mandatory savings (individual 
pension contributions) crowd out the voluntary savings by 
one-for-one. However, the firm contribution rate has effect 
on the capital-labor ratio because it appears in the dynamic 
system. 
III. SOCIAL OPTIMUM 
By controlling the firm contribution rate, one can adjust 
the capital-labor ratio to the modified golden rule level to 
maximize social welfare. The social welfare is the sum of the 
lifetime utilities of all current and future generations 
(Blanchard and Fischer [7] and Groezen et al. [9] also use an 
analogous social welfare function): 
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(13) 
where ( )10,∈ρ  is the social discount rate, which indicates 
how much the social planner weights different generations 
in the social welfare calculations. 
The resource constraint is 
( ) ( )ncpcknAkk iiiii ++++=+ + 11 211α .      (14) 
The initial condition, k0, is given. The social planner 
maximizes the social welfare subject to the resource 
constraint and initial condition. The first-order conditions for 
the social welfare maximization problem are: 
∗∗
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( ) ( )[ ] 111 −∗ −+= αραρ Ank ,                  (16) 
where the superscript * denotes the optimal steady state 
values of variables. The capital-labor ratio satisfying (16) is 
at the modified golden rule level, where the social welfare 
achieves the maximum. 
In order to maximize the social welfare of the market 
economy in the steady state, we control the policy variable to 
adjust the capital-labor ratio of the market economy to the 
modified golden rule level, namely, k=k∗. Substituting (16) 
into (12) and arranging gives 
( )
( ) ( ) 01111
111
2
2
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+
−−+++
+
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+
−
+
+−
ϕ
ρα
ρδ
ρ
θ
ρα
ρ
ρϕθδ
nnpnnp
nnnppp
,  (17) 
where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+
⋅
+
−
+
+
+
=
∗
∗
ρα
ρ
η
αη
ρδθϕ
n
p
n 1
1
111 . Hence, the 
optimal firm contribution rate η∗ is an implicit function of θ, 
δ, ρ, α, p and n. 
IV. OPTIMAL FIRM CONTRIBUTION RATE 
The effects of the life expectancy and population growth 
rate on the optimal firm contribution rate can be obtained by 
partially differentiating η∗ with respective to p and n. It is 
shown that the signs of the derivatives depend on the values 
of the parameters. Hence, we estimate the parameter values 
and check the effects by simulating. 
A. Estimation of Parameter Values 
Analogous to Pecchenino and Pollard [10], we assume 
that the individual discount rate per year is 0.985, the 
altruism intensity per year 0.965, and a period length 26 
years. Hence, in a period, θ=0.98526, and δ=0.96526.  
The capital share of income, α, is usually to be estimated 
as 0.3 in developed countries. The labor in China is 
comparatively cheaper, and thus the labor share of income is 
lower, while the capital share of income is higher than that in 
developed countries. Hence, we assume that α in China 
could be 0.35. 
According to UN Secretariat [11], the life expectancy of 
Chinese people in 2000-2005 is 72.0 years old. Since the 
life-span from birth to the end of working-period is 52 years 
and that from birth to the end of retirement-period is 78 years, 
by virtue of the concept of life expectancy, one can get that 
(1-p)×52+p×78=72.0, which gives p≈76.92%.  
There are several calibers for population statistics in 
China. Since the public pension system in urban area is 
different from that in rural area, and only the former is 
studied in this paper, so the caliber of “Urban Population” is 
selected. The population growth rate during 1978-2004 is 
computed to be n≈2.148 according to the “Population and Its 
Composition” in China Statistical Yearbook, which has 
reflected immigration from countryside.  
The social discount rate is estimated in accordance with 
the stipulated firm contribution rate, 20%, which is the 
optimal firm contribution rate adopted by the government. 
Substituting the above relative parameter values into (17) 
and calculating repeatedly until the equation holds, we get 
ρ≈0.7473. These estimated values are baseline parameter 
values. 
B. Risen Life Expectancy 
According to UN Secretariat [11], the life expectancy of 
Chinese people in 2005-2010 is 73.0 years old, and that in 
2010-2015 is 74.0 years old. Hence, the survival 
probabilities in retirement period are 80.77% and 84.62%, 
respectively. When the survival probability is 80.77%, 
substituting it and the baseline values of θ, δ, α, ρ and n into 
(17) gives η∗≈20.60%. When the survival probability is 
84.62%, analogous simulation gives the result shown in 
Table Ⅰ. The rise in the life expectancy leads to the increase 
in the optimal firm contribution rate. 
C. Fallen Population Growth Rate 
Since the current term, 2005-2015, is more concerned, 
we look into the population growth rates during the periods 
including the current term, such as period 1984-2010 and 
period 1989-2015. It is necessary to predict the urban 
population in each year from 2007 to 2015. The sample is 
the “Urban Population” in China Statistical Yearbook in 
each year from 1978 to 2006. Using the TREND function in 
Excel gives the result shown in Appendix A. The value of 
R2≈0.9725 implies a very good fit. Computing the population 
growth rates gives that the rate during 1984-2010 is 1.500, 
and that during 1989-2015 is 1.272. Simulating with the 
population growth rates and the baseline values of θ, δ, α, ρ 
and p gives the result shown in Table Ⅱ. The fall in the 
population growth rate induces the decrease in the optimal 
firm contribution rate. 
D. Risen Life Expectancy and Fallen Population Growth 
Rate 
Simulating the four combinations of the above survival 
probabilities and population growth rates gives the result 
shown in Table Ⅲ. The optimal firm contribution rate falls 
under the joint case of risen life expectancy and fallen 
population growth rate. This is because that the elasticity of 
η∗ with respect to n is much higher than to p. It implies that 
the optimal firm contribution rate is much more sensitive to 
the population growth rate than to life expectancy. 
TABLE I.  η∗ UNDER RISEN LIFE EXPECTANCY 
p 76.92% 80.77% 84.62% 
η∗ 20.00% 20.60% 21.11% 
TABLE II.  η∗ UNDER FALLEN POPULATION GROWTH RATE 
n 2.148 1.500 1.272 
η∗ 20.00% 14.19% 11.23% 
TABLE III.  η∗ UNDER RISEN LIFE EXPECTANCY AND FALLEN 
POPULATION GROWTH RATE AND THE ELASTICITY 
p n η∗ 
elasticity of 
η∗ with 
respect to  p 
elasticity of 
η∗ with 
respect to n 
80.77% 1.500 14.58% – – 
80.77% 1.272 11.51% – 138% 
84.62% 1.500 14.87% 43% – 
84.62% 1.272 11.71% 35% 140% 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Supposing that individuals are altruistic, this paper 
employs an OLG model with lifetime uncertainty to 
investigate the urban public pension in China. By controlling 
the policy variable and adjusting the capital-labor ratio in 
market economy to the modified golden rule level to 
maximize the social welfare, we find the optimal firm 
contribution rate. It is shown to be dependent on the 
individual discount rate, altruism intensity, social discount 
rate, capital share of income, life expectancy and population 
growth rate. Simulations show that the rise in the life 
expectancy leads to the increase in the optimal firm 
contribution rate, whereas the fall in the population growth 
rate induces the decrease in the optimal firm contribution 
rate. Because the optimal firm contribution rate is much 
more sensitive to the population growth rate than to life 
expectancy, it decreases under the joint case of risen life 
expectancy and fallen population growth rate. 
This result is advantageous for firms to reduce the heavy 
burden regarding social insurance. The social insurance in 
China includes public pension, medical, unemployment, 
work-related injury, and maternity insurances. The firm 
contribution rates for the five lines of insurance are 20%, 
6%, 2%, 1%, and 1%, respectively. The total contribution 
rate composed of social insurance and housing security has 
amounted to 40% of firm’s payroll. The heavy burden can be 
reduced if the firm pension contribution rate could be 
decreased. 
 
APPENDIX A. PREDICTED URBAN POPULATION IN EACH YEAR FROM 2007 TO 2015 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Population (10000 persons) 55794 57208 58621 60035 61448 62862 64276 65689 67103 
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